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Abstract
Many societal decision problems lie in high-dimensional continuous spaces not amenable
to the voting techniques common for their discrete or single-dimensional counterparts. These
problems are typically discretized before running an election or decided upon through negotiation
by representatives. We propose a algorithm called Iterative Local Voting for collective
decision-making in this setting. In this algorithm, voters are sequentially sampled and asked to
modify a candidate solution within some local neighborhood of its current value, as defined by
a ball in some chosen norm, with the size of the ball shrinking at a specified rate.
We first prove the convergence of this algorithm under appropriate choices of neighborhoods
to Pareto optimal solutions with desirable fairness properties in certain natural settings: when
the voters’ utilities can be expressed in terms of some form of distance from their ideal solution,
and when these utilities are additively decomposable across dimensions. In many of these cases,
we obtain convergence to the societal welfare maximizing solution.
We then describe an experiment in which we test our algorithm for the decision of the U.S.
Federal Budget on Mechanical Turk with over 2,000 workers, employing neighborhoods defined
by L1,L2 and L∞ balls. We make several observations that inform future implementations of
such a procedure.
1 Introduction
Methods and experiments to increase large-scale, direct citizen participation in policy-making
have recently become commonplace as an attempt to revitalize democracy. Computational and
crowdsourcing techniques involving human-algorithm interaction have been a key driver of this
trend [5, 21, 22, 28]. Some of the most important collective decisions, whether in government or in
business, lie in high-dimensional, continuous spaces – e.g. budgeting, taxation brackets and rates,
collectively bargained wages and benefits, urban planning etc. Direct voting methods originally de-
signed for categorical decisions are typically infeasible for collective decision-making in such spaces.
Supported by NSF grant nos. CCF-1408784, CCF-1637397, CCF-1637418, and IIS-1447554, ONR grant no.
N00014-15-1-2786, ARO grant no. W911NF-14-1-0526, and the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship under grant no.
DGE-114747. This work benefited from many helpful discussions with Oliver Hinder.
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Although there has been some theoretical progress on designing mechanisms for continuous decision-
making [8, 24, 27], in practice these problems are usually resolved using traditional approaches –
they are either discretized before running an election, or are decided upon through negotiation by
committee, such as in a standard representative democracy [5, 14, 15, 30, 32].
One of the main reasons for the current gap between theory and practice in this domain is the
challenge of designing practically implementable mechanisms. We desire procedures that are simple
enough to explain and use in practice, and that result in justifiable solutions while being robust
to the inevitable deviations from ideal models of user behavior and preferences. To address this
challenge, a social planner must first make practically reasonable assumptions on the nature and
complexity of feedback that can be elicited from people and then design simple algorithms that
operate effectively under these conditions. Further, while robustness to real-world model deviations
may be difficult to prove in theory, it can be checked in practice through experiments.
We first tackle the question of what type of feedback voters can give. In general, for the types
of problems we wish to solve, a voter cannot fully articulate her utility function. Even if voters
in a voting booth had the patience to state their exact utility for a reasonably large number of
points (e.g. how much they liked each candidate solution on a scale from one to five), there is no
reason to believe that they could do so in any consistent manner. On the other hand, we posit that
it is relatively easy for people to choose their favorite amongst a reasonably small set of options,
or articulate how they would like to locally modify a candidate solution to better match their
preferences. Such an assumption is common and is a central motivation in social choice, especially
implicit utilitarian voting [26].
In this paper, we study and experimentally test a type of algorithm for large-scale preference
aggregation that effectively leverages the possibility of asking voters such easy questions. In this
algorithm that we call Iterative Local Voting (ILV), voters are sequentially sampled and are
asked to modify a candidate solution to their favorite point within some local neighborhood, until
a stable solution is obtained (if at all). With a continuum of voters, no one votes more than once.
The algorithm designer has flexibility in deciding how these local neighborhoods are defined – in
this paper we focus on neighborhoods that are balls in the Lq norm, and in particular on the cases
where q = 1, 2 or ∞. (For M <∞ dimensional vectors, the Lq norm ‖x‖q , q
√∑
m |xm|q. q = 1, 2
and ∞ neighborhoods correspond to bounds on the sum of absolute values of the changes, the sum
of the square of the changes, and the maximum change, respectively.)
More formally, consider aM -dimensional societal decision problem in X ⊂ RM and a population
of voters V, where each voter v ∈ V has bounded utility fv(x) ∈ R, ∀x ∈ X . Then we consider
the class of algorithms described in Algorithm 1. We study the algorithm class under two plausible
models of how voters respond to query (1), which asks for the voter’s favorite point in a local region.
• Model A: One possibility is that voters exactly perform the maximization asked of them, re-
sponding with their favorite point in the given Lq norm constraint set. In other words, they return
a point arg maxx∈{s:‖s−xt−1‖q≤rt}fvt(x). Note that by definition of this movement, the algorithm
is myopically incentive compatible: if a voter is the last voter and no projections are used, then
truthfully performing this movement is the dominant strategy. In general, the mechanism is not
globally incentive compatible, nor incentive compatible with projections onto the feasible region.
Simple examples of manipulations in both instances exist.
• Model B: On the other hand, voters may not actually search within the constraint set to find
their favorite point inside of it. Rather, a voter v may have an idea about how to best improve the
current point and then move in that direction to the boundary of the given constraint set. This
model leads to a voter moving the current solution in the direction of the gradient of her utility
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Algorithm 1: Iterative Local Voting (ILV)
Inputs: Initial solution x0 ∈ X , tolerance  > 0, an integer N , initial radius r0 > 0,
termination time T , norm q for local neighborhood.
Output: Solution x.
• For t ≥ 1, sample a voter vt ∈ V at random from the population; set rt = r0/t and elicit
x′t = arg maxx∈{s:‖s−xt−1‖q≤rt}fvt(x), (1)
and then compute xt = [x′t]X , where [·]X is a projection onto space X ; i.e. ask the voter to
move to her favorite point within the constraints, and find the projection of the reported
point onto X .
• Stop when either t = T , in which case return xT , or when maxl,m∈{t−N,...,t} |xl − xm| ≤ , in
which case return x = xt.
function, returning a point xt−1 + rt gt‖gt‖q , for some gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt−1). Note that ∂f(x) denotes the
set of subgradients of a function f at x, i.e. g ∈ ∂f(x) if ∀y, f(y)− f(x) ≥ gT (y − x).
ILV is directly inspired by the stochastic approximation approach to solve optimization problems
[29], especially stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and the stochastic subgradient method (SSGM).
The idea is that if (a) voter preferences are drawn from some probability distribution and (b) the
response of a voter to the query (1) moves the solution approximately in the direction of her utility
gradient, then this procedure almost implements stochastic gradient descent for minimizing negative
expected utility.
The caveat is that although the procedure can potentially obtain the direction of the gradient
of the voter utilities, it cannot in general obtain any information about its magnitude since the
movement norm is chosen by the procedure itself. However, we show that for certain plausible
utility and voter response models, the algorithm does indeed converge to a unique point with
desirable properties, including cases in which it converges to the societal optimum.
Note that with such feedback and without any additional assumptions on voter preferences (e.g.
that voter utilities are normalized to the same scale), no algorithm has any hope of finding a desirable
solution that depends on the cardinal values of voters’ utilities, e.g., the social welfare maximizing
solution (the solution that maximizes the sum of agent utilities). This is because an algorithm that
uses only ordinal information about voter preferences is insensitive to any scaling or even monotonic
transformations of those preferences.
1.1 Contributions
This work is a step in extending the vast literature in social choice to continuous spaces, taking into
account the feedback that voters can actually give. Our main theoretical contributions are as follows:
• Convergence for Lp normed utilities: We show that if the agents cost functions can be
expressed as the Lp distance from their ideal solution, and if agents correctly respond to query (1),
then an interesting duality emerges: for p = 1, 2 or ∞, using Lq neighborhoods, where q =∞, 2
and 1 respectively, results in the algorithm converging to the unique social welfare optimizing
solution. Whether such a result holds for general (p, q), where q is the dual norm to p (i.e.
1/p + 1/q = 1), is an open question. However, we show that such a general result holds if, in
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response to query (1), the voter instead moves the current solution in the direction of the gradient
of her utility function to the neighborhood boundary.
• Convergence for other utilities: Next, we show convergence to a unique solution in two cases:
(a) when the voter cost can be expressed as a weighted sum of L2 distances over sub-spaces of the
solution space, under L2 neighborhoods – in which case the solution is also Pareto efficient, and
(b) when the voter utility can be additively decomposed across dimensions, under L∞ neighbor-
hoods – in which case the algorithm converges to the median of the ideal solutions of the voters
on each dimension.
We then build a platform and run the first large-scale experiment in voting in multi-dimensional
continuous spaces, in a budget allocation setting. We test three variants of ILV: with L1, L2 and
L∞ neighborhoods. Our main findings are as follows:
• We observe that the algorithm with L∞ neighborhoods is the only alternative that satisfies the
first-order concern for real-world deployability: consistent convergence to a unique stable solution.
Both L1 and L2 neighborhoods result in convergence to multiple solutions.
• The consistent convergence under L∞ neighborhoods in experiments strongly suggests the de-
composability of voter utilities for the budgeting problem. Motivated by this observation, we
propose a general class of decomposable utility functions to model user behavior for the budget
allocation setting.
• We make several qualitative observations about user behavior and preferences. For instance, vot-
ers have large indifference regions in their utilities, with potentially larger regions in dimensions
about which they care about less. Further, we show that asking voters for their ideal budget
allocations and how much they care about a given item is fraught with UI biases and should be
carefully designed.
We remark that an additional attractive feature of such a constrained local update algorithm
in a large population setting is that strategic behavior from the voters is less of a concern: even
if a single voter is strategic, her effect on the outcome is negligible. Further, it may be difficult
for a voter, or even a coalition of voters, to strategically vote; one must reason over the possible
future trajectories of the algorithm over the randomness of future voters. One coalition strategy for
L2 and L∞ neighborhoods, voters trade votes on different dimensions with one another; we leave
robustness to such strategies to future work.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After discussing related work in Section 2, we present
convergence results for our algorithm under different settings in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce
the budget allocation problem and describe our experimental platform. In Section 5, we analyze
the experiment results, and then we conclude the paper in Section 6. The proofs of our results are
in the appendix.
2 Related Work
Our work relates to various strands of literature. We note that a conference version of this work
appeared previously [13]. Furthermore, the term “iterative voting” is also used in other works to
denote unrelated methods [1, 23].
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Stochastic Gradient Descent As discussed in the introduction, we draw motivation from the
stochastic subgradient method (SSGM), and our main proof technique is mapping our algorithm
to SSGM. Beginning with the original stochastic approximation algorithm by Robbins and Monro
[29], a rich literature surrounds SSGM, for instance see [4, 19, 25, 31].
Iterative local voting A version of our algorithm, with L2 norm neighborhoods, has been pro-
posed independently several times [3, 9, 17] and is referred to as Normalized Gradient Ascent (NGA).
Instead of directly asking voters to perform query (1), the movement ∇fv(xt−1)‖∇fv(xt−1)‖2 would be estimated
through population surveys to try to compute the fixed point where Ev
[ ∇fv(x)
‖∇fv(x)‖2
]
= 0. (Note that
we work with distributions of voters and for strictly concave utility functions, the movement for
each voter is well-defined for all but a measure 0 set. Then, given a bounded density function of
voters, the expectation is well-defined).
This fixed point has been called Directional Equilibrium (DE) in the recent literature [9]. The
movement is equivalent to the movement in this work in the case voters respond according to
Model B and with L2 neighborhoods, and we show in Section 3.3 that, in such cases, the algorithm
converges to a Directional Equilibrium when it converges. We further conjecture that even under
voter Model A, if Algorithm 2 converges, the fixed point is a Directional Equilibrium.
Several properties of the fixed point have been studied, starting from [17] to more recently,
[9] and [3]: it exists under light assumptions, is Pareto efficient, and has important connections
to the Majority Core literature in economics. Showing that an iterative algorithm akin to ours
converges to such a point has been challenging; indeed, except for special cases such as quadratic
utilities fv(x) = −(x − xv)TΩ(x − xv), with society-wide Ω that encodes the relative importance
and relationships between issues [3], convergence is an open question.
Our algorithm differs from NGA in a few crucial directions, even in the case that the movement
is equivalent: by relating our algorithm to SGD, we are able to characterize the step-size behavior
necessary for convergence and show convergence even when each step is made by a single voter,
rather than after an estimate of the societal normalized gradient. One can also characterize the
convergence rate of the algorithm [25]. Furthermore, the literature has referred to the L2 norm
(or “quadratic budget”) constraint as “central to their strategic properties” [2]. In this work, this
limitation is relaxed – the same strategic property, myopic incentive compatibility, holds for the
other norm constraints for their respective cases.
Finally, because we are primarily interested in designing implementable voting mechanisms, we
focus on somewhat different concerns than the directional equilibria literature. However, we believe
that the ideas in this work, especially the connections to the optimization literature, may prove
useful to work on NGA. To the best of our knowledge, no work studies such an algorithm with other
neighborhoods and under ordinal feedback, or implements such an algorithm.
Optimization without gradients Because we are concerned with optimization without access to
voters’ utility functions or its gradients, this work seems to be in the same vein as recent literature
on convex optimization without gradients – such as with comparisons or with pairs of function
evaluations [10–12, 18]. However, in the social choice or human optimization setting, we cannot
estimate each voter’s utility functions or gradients exactly rather than up to a scaling term, and yet
we would like to find some point with good societal properties. This limitation prevents the use of
strategies from such works.
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Jamieson et al. [18], for example, present an optimal coordinate-descent based algorithm to find
the optimum of a function for the case in which noisy comparisons are available on that function;
in our setting, such an algorithm could be used to find the optimal value for each voter, but not
the societal optimum because each voter can independently scale her utility function. Duchi et al.
[10] present a distributed optimization algorithm where each node (voter) has access to its own
subgradients and a few of its neighbors, but in our case each voter can arbitrarily scale her utility
function and thus her subgradients. Similar problems emerge in applying results from the work
of Duchi et al. [11]. In our work, such scaling does not affect the point to which the algorithm
converges.
Participatory Budgeting The experimental setting for this work, and a driving motivation, is
Participatory Budgeting, in which voters are asked to help create a government budget. Partici-
patory budgeting has been among the most successful programs of Crowdsourced Democracy, with
deployments throughout the world allocating hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and studies
have shown its civic engagement benefits [5, 14, 15, 21, 22, 30, 32].
In a typical election, community members propose projects, which are then refined and voted on
by either their representatives or the entire community, through some discrete aggregation scheme.
In no such real-world election, to our knowledge, can the amount of money to allocate to a project
be determined in a continuous space within the voting process, except through negotiation by
representatives.
Goel et al. [15] propose a “Knapsack Voting” mechanism in which each voter is asked to create
a valid budget under the budget constraint; the votes are then aggregated using K-approval ag-
gregation on each dollar in the budget, allowing for fully continuous allocation in the space. This
mechanism is strategy-proof under some voter utility models. In comparison, our mechanism works
in more general spaces and is potentially easier for voters to do.
Implicit Utilitarian Voting With a finite number of candidates, the problem of optimizing some
societal utility function (based on the cardinality of voter utilities) given only ordinal feedback is
well-studied, with the same motivation as in this work: ordinal feedback such as rankings and subset
selections are relatively easy for voters to provide. The focus in such work, referred to as implicit
utilitarian voting, is to minimize the distortion of the output selected by a given voting rule, over
all possible utility functions consistent with the votes, i.e. minimize the worst case error achieved
by the algorithm due to an under-determination of utility functions when only using the provided
inputs [6, 7, 16, 26]. In this work, we show convergence of our algorithm under certain implicit
utility function forms. However, we do not characterize the maximum distortion of the resulting
fixed point (or even the convergence to any fixed point) under any utility functions consistent with
the given feedback, leaving such analysis for future work.
3 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we discuss the convergence properties of ILV under various utility and behavior
models. For the rest of the technical analysis, we make the following assumptions on our model.
C1 The solution space X ⊆ RM is non-empty, bounded, closed, and convex.
C2 Each voter v has a unique ideal solution xv ∈ X .
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Model A Model B
Spatial, (p, q) = (2, 2), (1,∞), or (∞, 1) Social Opt. (Thm 1)
Spatial, (p, q) s.t. 1/p+ 1/q = 1 ? Social Opt. (Thm 2)
Weighted Euclidean Social Opt. (Thm 1)
Decomposable Medians (Thm 2)
Table 1: Summary of convergence results
C3 The ideal point xv of each voter is drawn independently from a probability distribution with
a bounded and measurable density function hX .
Under this model, for a solution x ∈ X , the societal utility is given by Ev[fv(x)]. and the social
optimal (SO) solution is any x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈X Ev[fv(x)].
“Convergence” of ILV refers to the convergence of the sequence of random variables {xt}t≥1 to
some x ∈ X with probability 1, assuming that the algorithm is allowed to run indefinitely (this
notion of convergence also implies the termination of the algorithm with probability 1).
In the following subsections, we present several classes of utility functions for which the algorithm
converges, summarized in Table 1. We further formalize the relationship to directional equilibria in
Section 3.3.
3.1 Spatial Utilities
Here we consider spatial utility functions, where the utilities of each voters can be expressed in the
form of some kind of spatial distance from their ideal solutions. First, we consider the following
kind of utilities.
Definition 1. Lp normed utilities. The voter utility function is Lp normed if fv(x) = −‖x −
xv‖p, ∀x ∈ X .
Under such utilities, for p = 1, 2 and ∞, restricting voters to a ball in the dual norm leads to
convergence to the societal optimum.
Theorem 1. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are Lp normed,
and voters respond to query (1) according to either Model A or Model B. Then, ILV with Lq
neighborhoods converges to the societal optimal point w.p. 1 when (p, q) = (2, 2), (1,∞), or (∞, 1).
The proof is contained in the appendix. A sketch of the proof is as follows. For the given
pairs (p, q), we show that, except in certain ‘bad’ regions, the update rule xt+1 = arg minx[‖x −
xvt‖p : ‖x − xt‖q ≤ rt] is equivalent to the stochastic subgradient method (SSGM) update rule
xt+1 = xt − rtgt, for some gt ∈ ∂Ev[‖x− xvt‖p], and that the probability of being in a ‘bad’ region
decreases fast enough as a function of rt. We then leverage a standard SSGM convergence result
to finish the proof. One natural question is whether the result extends to general dual norms p, q,
where 1/p+ 1/q = 1. Unfortunately, the update rule is not equivalent to SSGM in general, and we
leave the convergence to the societal optimum for general (p, q) as an open question.
Further, note that even if each voter could scale their utility function arbitrarily, the algorithm
would converge to the same point.
However, the general result does hold for general dual norms (p, q) if one assumes the alternative
behavior model.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are Lp normed,
and voters respond to query (1) according to Model B. Then, ILV with Lq neighborhoods converges
to the societal optimal point w.p. 1 for any p > 0 and q > 0 such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
The proof is contained in the appendix. It uses the following property of Lp normed utilities: the
Lq norm of the gradient of these utilities at any point other than the ideal point is constant. This
fact, along with the voter behavior model, allows the algorithm to implicitly capture the magnitude
of the gradient of the utilities, and thus a direct mapping to SSGM is obtained. Note that the above
result holds even if we assume that a voter moves to her ideal point xv in case it falls within the
neighborhood (since, as explained earlier, the probability of sampling such a voter decreases fast
enough).
Next, we introduce another general class of utility functions, which we call Weighted Euclidean
utilities, for which one can obtain convergence to a unique solution.
Definition 2. Weighted Euclidean utilities. Let the solution space X be decomposable into K
different sub-spaces, so that x = (x1, . . . , xK) for each x ∈ X (where ∑Kk=1 dim(xk) = M). Suppose
that the utility function of the voter v is
fv(x) = −
K∑
k=1
wkv
‖wv‖2 ‖x
k − xkv‖2.
where wv is a voter-specific weight vector, then the function is a Weighted Euclidean utility function.
We further assume that wv ∈ W ⊂ RK+ and xv are independently drawn for each voter v from a
joint probability distribution with a bounded and measurable density function, with W nonempty,
bounded, closed, and convex.
This utility function can be interpreted as follows: the decision-making problem is decomposable
into K sub-problems, and each voter v has an ideal point xkv and a weight wkv for each sub-problem
k, so that the voter’s disutility for a solution is the weighted sum of the Euclidean distances to the
ideal points in each sub-problems. Such utility functions may emerge in facility location problems,
for example, where voters have preferences on the locations of multiple facilities on a map. This
utility form is also the one most closely related to the existing literature on Directional Equilibria
and Quadratic Voting, in which preferences are linear. To recover the weighted linear preferences
case, set K = M , with each sub-space of dimension 1. In this case, the following holds:
Proposition 1. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are
Weighted Euclidean, and voters correctly respond to query (1) according to either Model A or
Model B. Then, ILV with L2 neighborhoods converges with probability 1 to the societal optimal
point.
The intuition for the result is as follows: as long as the neighborhood does not contain the ideal
point of the sampled voter, the correct response to query (1) under weighted Euclidean preferences
is to move the solution in the direction of the ideal point to the neighborhood boundary, which, as it
turns out, is the same as the direction of the gradient. Thus with radius rt, the effective movement is∇fv(xt)
||∇fv(xt)||2 . With (normalized) weighted Euclidean utilities, ‖∇fv(xt)‖2 = 1 everywhere. As before,
even if the utilities were not normalized (i.e. not divided by ‖w‖2), the algorithm would converge
to the same point, as if utility functions were normalized.
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3.2 Decomposable Utilities
Next consider the general class of decomposable utilities, motivated by the fact that the algorithm
with L∞ neighborhoods is of special interest since they are easy for humans to understand: one can
change each dimension up to a certain amount, independent of the others.
Definition 3. Decomposable utilities. A voter utility function is decomposable if there exists
concave functions fmv for m ∈ {1 . . .M} such that fv(x) =
∑M
m=1 f
m
v (x
m).
If the utility functions for the voters are decomposable, then we can show that our algorithm un-
der L∞ neighborhoods converges to the vector of medians of voters’ ideal points on each dimension.
Suppose that hmX is the marginal density function of the random variable x
m
v , and let x¯m be the set
of medians of xmv . (By set of medians, we mean the set of points such that, on each dimension, the
mass of voters with ideal points above and below.)
Proposition 2. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are de-
composable, and voters respond to query (1) according to either Model A or Model B. Then, ILV
with L∞ neighborhoods converges with probability 1 to a point in the set of medians x¯.
Although simply eliciting each agent’s optimal solution and computing the vector of median
allocations on each dimension is a viable approach in the case of decomposable utilities, deciding
an optimal allocation across multiple dimensions is a more challenging cognitive task than deciding
whether one wants to increase or decrease each dimension relative to the current solution (see
Section 5.2.3 for experimental evidence). In fact, in this case, the algorithm can be run separately
for each dimension, so that each voter expresses her preferences on only one dimension, drastically
reducing the cognitive burden of decision-making on the voter, especially in high dimensional settings
like budgeting.
3.3 Equivalence to Directional Equilibrium
As discussed in Section 2, our algorithm, with L2-norm neighborhoods, is related to an algorithm,
NGA, to find what are called Directional Equilibria in literature. Prior work mostly focuses on the
properties of the fixed point, with discussion of the proposed algorithm limited to simulations. We
show that with the radius decreasing as O(1t ), the algorithm indeed finds directional equilibria in
the following sense: if under a few conditions a trajectory of the algorithm converges to a point,
then that point is a directional equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Suppose that C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, and let G(x) , Ev
[ ∇fv(x)
‖∇fv(x)‖2
]
. Suppose,
G(x) is uniformly continuous, L2 movement norm constraints are used, and voters move according
to Model B. If a trajectory {x}∞t=1 of the algorithm converges to x∗, i.e. xt → x∗, then x∗ is a
directional equilibrium, i.e. G(x∗) = 0.
The proof is in the appendix. It relies heavily on the continuity assumption: if a point x is not
a directional equilibrium, then the algorithm with step sizes O(1t ) will with probability 1 leave any
small region surrounding x: the net drift of the voter movements is away from the region. We note
that the necessary assumptions hold for all utility functions for which convergence holds, using the
L2 norm algorithm (e.g. weighted Euclidean utilities). It is further possible to characterize other
utility functions for which the equivalence holds: with appropriate conditions on the distribution of
voters and how f differs among voters, the conditions on G can be met.
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We further conjecture that even under voter Model A, if Algorithm 2 converges, the fixed point
is a Directional Equilibrium. Note that as rt → 0, fv(y) can be linearly approximated by the first
term of the Taylor series expansion around x, for y ∈ {s : ||s− x||2 ≤ rt}. Then, to maximize fv(y)
in the region, if the region does not contain xv voter v chooses y∗ s.t. y∗ − x ≈ rt ∇f(x)||∇f(x)||2 , i.e.,
the voter moves the solution approximately in the direction of her gradient to the neighborhood
boundary.
A single step of our algorithm with L2 neighborhoods is similar to Quadratic Voting [20, 34] for
the same reason. Independently of our work, Benjamin et al. [2] formalize the relationship between
the Normalized Gradient Ascent mechanism and Quadratic Voting.
4 Experiments with Budgets
We built a voting platform and ran a large scale experiment, along with several extensive pilots,
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com). Over 4,000 workers participating in total
counting pilots and the final experiment, with over 2,000 workers participating in the final experi-
ment. The design challenges we faced and voter feedback we received provide important lessons for
deploying such systems in a real-world setting.
First we present a theoretical model for our setting. We consider a budget allocation problem
on M items, where the items may include both expenditures and incomes. One possibility is to
define X as the space of feasible allocations, such as those below a spending limit, and to run the
algorithm as defined, with projections. However, in such cases, it may be difficult to theorize about
how voters behave; e.g. if voters knew their answers would be projected onto a budget balanced
set, they may respond differently.
Rather, we consider an unconstrained budget allocation problem, one in which a voter’s utility
includes a term for the budget deficit. Let E ⊆ {1 . . .M}, I = {1 . . .M} \E be the expenditure and
income items, respectively. Then the general budget utility function is fv(x) = gv(x)− d(
∑
e∈E x
e−∑
i∈I x
i), where d is an increasing function on the deficit.
For example, suppose a voter’s disutility was proportional to the square of the budget deficit (she
especially dislikes large budget deficits); then, this term adds complex dependencies between the
budget items. In general, nothing is known about convergence of Algorithm 1 with such utilities, as
the deficit term may add complex dependencies between the dimensions. However, if the voter utility
functions are decomposable across the dimensions and L∞ neighborhoods used, then the results of
Section 3.2 can be applied. We propose the following class of decomposable utility functions for the
budgeting problem, achieved by assuming that the cost for the deficit is linear, and call the class
“decomposable with a linear cost for deficit," or DLCD.
Definition 4. Let fv(x) be DLCD if
fv(x) =
M∑
m=1
fmv (x
m)− wv
(∑
e∈E
xe −
∑
i∈I
xi
)
,
where fmv is a concave function for each m and wv ∈ R+.
In the experiments discussed below in the budget setting, ILV consistently and robustly converges
with L∞ norm neighborhoods. Further, it approximately converges to the medians of the optimal
solutions (which are elicited independently), as theorized in Section 3.2. Such a convergence pattern
suggests the validity of the DLCD model, though we do not formally analyze this claim.
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4.1 Experimental Setup
We asked voters to vote on the U.S. Federal Budget across several of its major categories: National
Defense; Healthcare; Transportation, Science, & Education; and Individual Income Tax (Note that
the US Federal Government cannot just decide to set tax receipts to some value. We asked workers
to assume tax rates would be increased or decreased at proportional rates in hopes of affecting
receipts.)
This setting was deemed the most likely to be meaningful to the largest cross-section of workers
and to yield a diversity of opinion, and we consider budgets a prime application area in general. The
specific categories were chosen because they make up a substantial portion of the budget and are
among the most-discussed items in American politics. We make no normative claims about running
a vote in this setting in reality, and Participatory Budgeting has historically been more successful
at a local level.
One major concern was that with no way to validate that a worker actually performed the task
(since no or little movement is a valid response if the solution presented to the worker was near
her ideal budget), we may not receive high-quality responses. This issue is especially important
in our setting because a worker’s actions influence the initial solution future workers see. We thus
restricted the experiment to workers with a high approval rate and who have completed over 500
tasks on Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Further, we offered a bonus to workers for justifying their
movements well, and more than 80% of workers qualified, suggesting that we also received high-
quality movements. The experiment was restricted to Americans to best ensure familiarity with the
setting. Turkprime (https://www.turkprime.com) was used to manage postings and payment.
4.2 Experimental Parameters
Our large scale experiment included 2,000 workers and ran over a week in real-time. Participants
of any of the pilots were excluded. We tested the L1,L2, and L∞ mechanisms, along with a “full
elicitation” mechanism in which workers reported their ideal values for each item, and a “weight” in
[0, 10] indicating how much they cared about the actual spending in that item being close to their
stated value.
To test repeatability of convergence, each of the constrained mechanisms had three copies, given
to three separate groups of people. Each group consisted of two sets with different starting points,
with each worker being asked to vote in each set in her assigned group. Each worker only participates
as part of one group, and cannot vote multiple times.
We used a total of three different sets of starting points across the three groups, such that each
group shared one set of starting points with each of the other two groups. This setup allowed testing
for repeatability across different starting points and observing each worker’s behavior at two points.
Workers in one group in each constrained mechanism type were also asked to do the full elicitation
after submitting their movements for the constrained mechanism, and such workers were paid extra.
These copies, along with the full elicitation, resulted in 10 different mechanism instances to which
workers could be allocated, each completed by about 200 workers.
To update the current point, we waited for 10 submissions and then updated the point to their
average. This averaging explains the step-like structure in the convergence plots in the next section.
The radius was decreased approximately every 60 submissions, rt u r0dt/60e . The averaging and slow
radius decay rate were implemented in response to observing in the pilots that the initial few voters
with a large radius had a disproportionately high impact, as there were not enough subsequent voters
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to recover from large initial movements away from an eventual fixed point (though in theory this
would not be a problem given enough voters). We note that the convergence results for stochastic
subgradient methods trivially extend to cover these modifications: the average movement over a
batch of submissions starting at the same point is still in expectation a subgradient, and the stepped
radius decrease still meets the conditions for valid step-sizes.
4.3 User Experience
Figure 1: UI Screenshot for 1 set of the L2 Mechanism
As workers arrived, they were randomly assigned to a mechanism instance. They had a roughly
equal probability of being assigned to each instance, with slight deviations in case an instance
was “busy” (another user was currently doing the potential 10th submission before an update of
the instance’s current point) and to keep the number of workers in each instance balanced. Upon
starting, workers were shown mechanism instructions. We showed the instructions on a separate
page so as to be able to separately measure the time it takes to read & understand a given mechanism,
and the time it takes to do it, but we repeated the instructions on the actual mechanism page as
well for reference.
On the mechanism page, workers were shown the current allocation for each of the two sets in
their group. They could then move, through sliders, to their favorite allocation under the movement
constraint. We explained the movement constraints in text and also automatically calculated for
them the number of “credits” their current movements were using, and how many they had left.
Next to each budget item, we displayed the percentage difference of the current value from the
2016 baseline federal budget, providing important context to workers (The 2016 budget estimate
was obtained from http://federal-budget.insidegov.com/l/119/2016-Estimate and http://
atlas.newamerica.org/education-federal-budget). We also provided short descriptions of what
goes into each budget item as scroll-over text. The resulting budget deficit and its percent change
were displayed above the sliders, assuming other budget items are held constant.
For the full elicitation mechanism, workers were asked to move the sliders to their favorite points
with no constraints (the sliders went from $0 to twice the 2016 value in that category), and then
were asked for their “weights” on each budget item, including the deficit. Figure 1 shows part of
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the interface for the L2 mechanism, not including instructions, with similar interfaces for the other
constrained mechanisms. The full elicitation mechanism additionally included sliders for items’
weights. On the final page, workers were asked for feedback on the experiment.
A full walk-through of the experiment with screenshots and link to an online demo is available
in the Appendix. We plan on posting the data, including feedback. In general, workers seemed
to like the experiment, though some complained about the constraints, and others were generally
confused. Some expressed excitement about being asked their views in an innovative manner and
suggested that everyone could benefit from participating as, at the least, a thought exercise. The
feedback and explanations provided by workers were much longer than we anticipated, and they
convince us of the procedure’s civic engagement benefits.
5 Results and Analysis
We now discuss the results of our experiments.
5.1 Convergence
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Figure 2: Solution over time for each mechanism type
One basic test of a voting mechanism is whether it produces a consistent and unique solution,
given a voting population and their behaviors. If an election process can produce multiple, distinct
solutions purely by chance, opponents can assail any particular solution as a fluke and call for a
re-vote. The question of whether the mechanisms consistently converge to the same point thus must
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Figure 2: (Continued) Solution over time for each mechanism type
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Figure 3: Net normalized movement in window of N = 30
be answered before analyzing properties of the equilibrium point itself. In this section, we show that
the L2 and L1 algorithms do not appear to converge to a unique point, while the L∞ mechanism
converges to a unique point across several initial points and with distinct worker populations.
The solutions after each voter for each set of starting points, across the 3 separate groups of
people for each constrained mechanism are shown in Figure 2. Each plot shows all the trajectories
with the given mechanism type, along with the median of the ideal points elicited from the separate
voters who only performed the full elicitation mechanism. Observe that the three mechanisms have
remarkably different convergence patterns. In the L1 mechanism, not even the sets done by the
same group of voters (in the same order) converged in all cases. In some cases, they converged for
some budget items but then diverged again. In the L2 mechanism, sets done by the same voters
starting from separate starting points appear to converge, but the three groups of voters seem to
have settled at two separate equilibria in each dimension. Under the L∞ neighborhood, on the other
hand, all six trajectories, performed by three groups of people, converged to the same allocation
very quickly and remained together throughout the course of the experiment. Furthermore, the
final points, in all dimensions except Healthcare, correspond almost exactly to the median of values
elicited from the separate set of voters who did only the full elicitation mechanism. For Healthcare,
the discrepancy could result from biases in full elicitation (see Section 5.2.4), though we make no
definitive claims. These patterns shed initial insight on how the use of L2 constraints may differ
from theory in prior literature and offer justification for the use of DLCD utility models and the
L∞ constrained mechanism.
One natural question is whether these mechanisms really have converged, or whether if we let
the experiment continue, the results would change. This question is especially salient for the L2
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Figure 3: (Continued) Net normalized movement in window of N = 30.
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trajectories, where trajectories within a group of people converged to the same point, but trajectories
between groups did not. Such a pattern could suggest that our results are a consequence of the
radius decreasing too quickly over time, or that the groups had, by chance, different distributions
of voters which would have been corrected with more voters. However, we argue that such does not
seem to be the case, and that the mechanism truly found different equilibria.
We can test whether the final points for each trajectory are stable by checking the net movement
in a window, normalized by each voter’s radius, i.e. 1N
∑t
s=t−N
xs−xs−1
rs
, for some N . If voters in a
window are canceling each other’s movements, then this value would go to 0, and the algorithm would
be stable even if the radius does not decrease. The notion is thus robust to apparent convergence
just due to decreasing radii. The net movement normalized in a sliding window of 30 voters, for
each dimension and mechanism, is shown in Figure 3. It seems to almost die down for almost all
mechanisms and budget items, except for a few cases which do not change the result. We conclude
it likely that the mechanisms have settled into equilibria which are unlikely to change given more
voters.
5.2 Understanding Voter Behavior
A mechanism’s practical impact depends on more than whether it consistently converges, however.
We now turn our attention to understanding how voters behave under each mechanism and whether
we can learn anything about their utility functions from that behavior. We find that voters under-
stood the mechanisms but that their behaviors suggest large indifference regions, and that the full
elicitation scheme is susceptible to biases that can skew the results.
5.2.1 Voter understanding of mechanisms
One important question is whether, given very little instruction on how to behave, voters understand
the mechanisms and act approximately optimally under their (unknown to us) utility function. This
section shows that the voters behavior follows what one would expect in one important respect: how
much of one’s movement budget the voter used on each dimension, given the constraint type.
Regardless of the exact form of the utility function, one would expect that, in the L1 constrained
mechanism, a voter would use most of her movement credits in the dimension about which she cares
most. In fact, in either the Weighted Euclidean preferences case (and with ‘sub-space’ being a single
dimension) or with a small radius with L1 constraints, a voter would move only on one dimension.
With L2 constraints, one would expect a voter to apportion her movement more equally because she
pays an increasing marginal cost to move more in one dimension (people were explicitly informed
of this consequence in the instructions). Under the Weighted Euclidean preferences model with L2
constraints, a voter would move in each dimension proportional to her weight in that dimension.
Finally, with L∞ constraints, a voter would move, in all dimensions in which she is not indifferent, to
her favorite point in the neighborhood for that dimension (most likely an endpoint), independently
of other dimensions. One would thus expect a more equal distribution of movements.
Figure 4 shows the average movement (as a fraction of the voter’s total movement) by each voter
for the dimension she moved most, second, third, and fourth, respectively, for each constrained
mechanism. We reserve discussion of the full elicitation weights for Section 5.2.4. The movement
patterns indicate that voters understood the constraints and moved accordingly – with more equal
movements across dimensions in L2 than in L1, and more equal movements still in L∞. We dig
deeper into user utility functions next, but can conclude that, regardless of their exact utility
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functions, voters responded to the constraint sets appropriately.
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5.2.2 Large indifference regions
Although it is difficult to extract a voter’s full utility function from their movements, the separability
of dimensions (except through the deficit term) under the L∞ constraint allows us to test whether
voters behave according to some given utility model in that dimension, without worrying about the
dependency on other dimensions.
Figure 5 shows, for the L∞ mechanism, a histogram of the movement on a dimension as a frac-
tion of the radius (we find no difference between dimensions here). Note that a large percentage of
voters moved very little on a dimension, even in cases where their ideal point in that dimension was
far away (defined as being unreachable under the current radius). This result cannot be explained
away by workers clicking through without performing the task: almost all workers moved at least
one dimension, and, given that a worker moved in a given dimension, it would not explain smaller
movements being more common than larger movements. That this pattern occurs in the L∞ mech-
anism is key – if a voter feels any marginal disutility in a dimension, she can move the allocation
without paying a cost of more limited movement in other dimensions. We conclude that, though
voters may share a single ideal point for a dimension when asked for it, they are in fact relatively
indifferent over a potentially large region – and their actions reflect so.
We further analyze this claim in Appendix Section B, looking at the same distribution of move-
ment but focusing on workers who provided a text explanation longer than (and shorter than,
separately) the median explanation of 197 characters. (We assume that the voters who invested
time in providing a more thorough explanation than the average worker also invested time in moving
the sliders to a satisfactory point, though this assumption cannot be validated.) Though there are
some differences (those who provide longer explanations also tend to use more of their movement),
the general pattern remains the same; only about 40% of workers who provided a long explanation
and were far away from their ideal point on a dimension used the full movement budget. This
pattern suggests that voters are relatively indifferent over large regions.
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Furthermore, this lack of movement is correlated with a voter’s weights when she was also asked
to do the full elicitation mechanism. Conditioned on being far from her ideal point, when a voter
ranked an item as one of her top two important items (not counting the deficit term), she moved
an average of 74% of her allowed movement in that dimension; when she ranked an item as one of
least two important items, she moved an average of 61%, and the difference is significant through
a two sample t-test with p = .013. We find no significant difference in movement within the top
two ranked items or within the bottom two ranked items. This connection suggests that one can
potentially determine which dimensions a voter cares about by observing these indifference regions
and movements, even in the L∞ constrained case. One caveat is that the differences in effects
are not large, and so at the individual level inference of how much an individual cares about one
dimension over another may be noisy. On the aggregate, however, such determination may prove
useful.
Furthermore, we note that while such indifference regions conflict with the utility models un-
der which the L2 constraint mechanism converges in theory, it fits within the DLCD framework
introduced in Section 4.
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instance that also did full elicitation.
5.2.3 Mechanism time
In this section, we note one potential problem with schemes that explicitly elicit voter’s optimal
solutions – for instance, to find the component-wise median – as compared to the constrained
elicitation used in ILV: it seems to be cognitively difficult for voters. In Figure 6, the median time
per page, aggregated across each mechanism type, is shown. The “Mechanism” time includes a
single user completing both sets in each of the constrained mechanism types, but not does include
the time to also do the extra full elicitation task in cases where a voter was asked to do both
a constrained mechanism and the full elicitation. The full elicitation bars include only voters
who did only the full elicitation mechanism, and so the bars are completely independent. On
average, it took longer to do the full elicitation mechanism than it took to do two sets of any
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of the constrained mechanisms, suggesting some level of cognitive difficulty in articulating one’s
ideal points and weights on each dimension – even though understanding what the instructions are
asking was simple, as demonstrated by the shorter instruction reading time for the full elicitation
mechanism. The L∞ mechanism took the least time to both understand and do, while the L2
mechanism took the longest to do, among the constrained mechanisms.
This result is intuitive: it is easier to move each budget item independently when the maximum
movement is bounded than it is to move the items when the sum or the sum of the changes squared
is bounded (even when these values are calculated for the voter). In practice, with potentially tens
of items on which constituents are voting, these relative time differences would grow even larger,
potentially rendering full elicitation or L2 constraints unpalatable to voters.
One potential caveat to this finding is that the Full Elicitation mechanism potentially provides
more information than do the other mechanisms. From a polling perspective, it is true that more
information is provided from full elicitation – one can see the distribution of votes, the disagreement,
and correlation across issues, among other things. However, from a voting perspective, in which the
aggregation (winner) is the only thing reported, it is not clear that this extra information is useful.
Further, much of this information that full elicitation provides can reasonably be extracted from
movements of voters, especially the movements of those who are given a starting point close to the
eventual equilibrium.
5.2.4 UI biases
We now turn our attention to the question of how workers behaved under the full elicitation mech-
anism and highlight some potential problems that may affect results in real deployments. Fig-
ures 7 and 8 show the histogram of values and weights, respectively, elicited from all workers who
did the full elicitation mechanism. Note that in the histogram of values, in every dimension, the
largest peak is at the slider’s default value (at the 2016 estimated budget), and the histograms seem
to undergo a phase shift at that peak, suggesting that voters are strongly anchored at the slider’s
starting value. This anchoring could systematically bias the medians of the elicited values.
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A similar effect occurs in eliciting voter weights on each dimension. Observe that in Figure 4 the
full elicitation weights appear far more balanced than the weights implied by any of the mechanisms
(for the full elicitation mechanism, the plot shows the average weight over the sum of the weights
for each voter). From the histogram of full elicitation weights, however, we see that this result is
a consequence of voters rarely moving a dimension’s weight down from the default of 5, but rather
moving others up.
One potential cause of this behavior is that voters might think that putting high weights on each
dimension would mean their opinions would count more, whereas in any aggregation one would either
ignore the weights (calculate the unweighted median) or normalize the weights before aggregating.
In future work, one potential fix could be to add a “normalize” button for the weights, which would
re-normalize the weights, or to automatically normalize the weights as voters move the sliders.
These patterns demonstrate the difficulty in eliciting utilities from voters directly; even asking
voters how much they care about a particular budget item is extremely susceptible to the user
interface design. Though such anchoring to the slider default undoubtedly also occurs in the L∞
constrained mechanism, it would only slow the rate of convergence, assuming the anchoring affects
different voters similarly. These biases can potentially be overcome by changing the UI design, such
as by providing no default value through sliders. Such design choices must be carefully thought
through before deploying real systems, as they can have serious consequences.
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Figure 7: Histogram of values from all full elicitation data. The red vertical lines indicate each
slider’s default value (at the 2016 estimated budget).
6 Conclusion
We evaluate a natural class of iterative algorithms for collective decision-making in continuous spaces
that makes practically reasonable assumptions on the nature of human feedback. We first introduce
several cases in which the algorithm converges to the societal optimum point, and others in which
the algorithm converges to other interesting solutions. We then experimentally test such algorithms
in the first work to deploy such a scheme. Our findings are significant: even with theoretical backing,
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Figure 8: Histogram of weights from all full elicitation data. The red vertical lines indicate the
sliders’ default value of 5.
two variants fail the basic test of being able to give a consistent decision across multiple trials with
the same set of voters. On the other hand, a variant that uses L∞ neighborhoods consistently leads
to convergence to the same solution, which has attractive properties under a likely model for voter
preferences suggested by this convergence. We also make certain observations about other properties
of user preferences – most saliently, that they have large indifferences on dimensions about which
they care less.
In general, this work takes a significant step within the broad research agenda of understanding
the fundamental limitations on the quality of societal outcomes posed by the constraints of human
feedback, and in designing innovative mechanisms that leverage this feedback optimally to obtain
the best achievable outcomes.
A Mechanical Turk Experiment Additional Information
In this section, we provide additional information regarding our Amazon Mechanical Turk experi-
ment, including a walk-through of the user experience. Furthermore, we have a live demo that can
be accessed at: http://gargnikhil.com/projectdetails/IterativeLocalVoting/. This demo
will remain online for the foreseeable future.
Figures 9 through 13 show screenshots of the experiment. We now walkthrough the experiment:
• Figure 9 – Welcome page. Arriving from Amazon Mechanical Turk, the workers read an
introduction and the consent agreement.
• Figure 10 – Instructions (shown are L2 instructions). The workers read the instructions, which
are also provided on the mechanism page. There is a 5 minute limit for this page.
• Figures 11, 13 – Mechanism page for L2 and Full Elicitation, respectively. For the former,
workers are asked to move to their favorite point within a constraint set, for 2 different budget
points. The “Current Credit Allocation” encodes the constraint set – as workers move the
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Figure 9: Page 1 – Welcome Page for all mechanisms
Figure 10: L2 Page 2 – Instructions
budget bars, it shows how much of their movement budget they have spent, and on which
items. The other constrained movement mechanisms are similar. For the Full Elicitation
mechanism, voters are simply asked to indicate their favorite budget point and weights. The
instructions are repeated on the mechanism page as well at the top. There is a 10 minute
limit for this page.
• Second mechanism, 30% of workers. Some workers were asked to do both one of the L1,L2, or
L∞, and the Full Elicitation mechanism. For these workers, the Full Elicitation mechanism
shows up after the constrained mechanism.
• Figure 12 – Feedback page. Finally, workers are asked to provide feedback, after which they
are shown a code and return to the Mechanical Turk website.
B Indifference Regions Additional Information
We now present some additional data for the claim in Section 5.2.2, that voters have large indifference
regions on the space. In particular, Figures 14 and 15 reproduce Figure 5 but with workers who
provided explanations longer (and shorter) than the median response, respectively. This split can
(roughly) correspond to workers who may have answered more or less sincerely to the budgeting
question. We find that the response distribution, as measured by the fraction of possible movement
one used when far away from one’s ideal point on a given dimension, are similar.
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Figure 11: L2 Page 3 – Mechanism
Figure 12: Page 4 – Feedback for all mechanisms
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Figure 13: Full Elicitation Page 3 – Mechanism
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Figure 14: Fraction of possible movement in each dimension in L∞, conditioned on distance to ideal
pt. The ‘All’ condition contains data from all three L∞ instances, whereas the others only from
the instance that also did full elicitation. This plot only includes those people who provided an
explanation as long or longer than the median explanation provided (197 characters).
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Figure 15: Fraction of possible movement in each dimension in L∞, conditioned on distance to ideal
pt. The ‘All’ condition contains data from all three L∞ instances, whereas the others only from
the instance that also did full elicitation. This plot only includes those people who provided an
explanation shorter than the median explanation provided (197 characters).
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C Proofs
In this appendix, we include proofs for all the theorems in the paper.
C.1 Known SSGM Results
Theorem 4. [25, 33] Let θ ∈ Θ be a random vector with distribution P. Let f¯(x) = E[f(x, θ)] =∫
Θ f(x, θ)dP (θ), for x ∈ X , a non-empty bounded closed convex set, and assume the expectation is
well-defined and finite valued. Suppose that f(·, θ), θ ∈ Θ is convex and f¯(·) is continuous and finite
valued in a neighborhood of point x. For each θ, choose any g(x, θ) ∈ ∂f(x, θ). Then, there exists
g¯(x) ∈ ∂f¯(x) s.t. g¯(x) = Eθ[g(x, θ)].
This theorem says that the expected value of the sub-gradient of the utility at any point x
across voters is a subgradient of the societal utility at x, irrespective of how the voters choose the
subgradient when there are multiple subgradients, i.e., when the utility function is not differentiable.
This key result allows us to use the subgradient of utility function of a sampled voter as an unbaised
estimate of the societal subgradient.
Now, consider a convex function f on a non-empty bounded closed convex set X ⊂ RM , and
use [·]X to designate the projection operator. Starting with some x0 ∈ X , consider the SSGM
update rule xt = [xt−1 − rt(g¯t + zt + bt)]X , where zt is a zero-mean random variable and bt is a
constant, and g¯t ∈ ∂f(xt). Let Et[·] be the conditional expectation given Ft, the σ-field generated
by x0, x1, . . . , xt. Then we have the following convergence result.
Theorem 5. [19] Consider the above update rule. If
f(·) has a unique minimizer x∗ ∈ X
rt > 0,
∑
t
rt =∞,
∑
t
r2t <∞
∃C1 ∈ R <∞ s.t. ‖∂f(x)‖2 ≤ C1,∀x ∈ X
∃C2 ∈ R <∞ s.t. Et[‖zt‖2] ≤ C2,∀ t
∃C3 ∈ R <∞ s.t. ‖bt‖2 ≤ C3, ∀ t∑
t
rt‖bt‖ <∞ w.p. 1
Then xt → x∗ w.p. 1 as t→∞.
Note: Jiang and Walrand [19] prove the result for gradients, though the same proof follows for
subgradients. Only the inequality [x∗− xt]T gt ≤ f(x∗)− f(xt) for gradient gt at iteration t is used,
which holds for subgradients. Boyd and Mutapcic [4] provide a general discussion of subgradient
methods, along with similar results. Shor [31], in Theorem 46, provide a convergence proof for the
stochastic subgradient method without projections and the extra noise terms.
C.2 Mapping ILV to SSGM
As described in Section 3, suppose that hX is the induced probability distribution on the ideal
values of the voters. In the following discussion, we will refer to voters and their ideal solutions
interchangeably.
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Next, we restate ILV without the stopping condition so that it looks like the stochastic subgra-
dient method. Consider Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: ILV
Start at some x0 ∈ X . For t ≥ 1,
• Sample voter vt ∈ V from hV .
• Compute xt = [xt−1 − rtg˜vt(xt)]X , where rt = r0t and rtg˜vt(xt) is movement given by vt.
We want to minimize the societal cost, f¯(x) = E[fv(x)]. From Theorem 4, it immediately follows
that if each voter v articulates a subgradient of her utility function for all x, i.e. g˜v(x) ∈ ∂fv(x),
then from Theorem 5, we can conclude that the algorithm converges. However, users may not be
able to articulate such a subgradient. Instead, when the voters respond correctly to query (1) (i.e.
move to their favorite point in the given Lq neighborhood), we have
g˜vt(xt) =
xt − arg minx[fvt(x) : ‖x− xt‖q ≤ rt]
rt
. (2)
Furthermore, for all the proofs, we assume the following.
A. The solution space X ⊂ RM is non-empty, bounded, closed, and convex.
B. Each voter v has a unique ideal solution xv ∈ X .
C. The ideal point xv of each voter is drawn independently from a probability distribution with
a bounded and measurable density function hX on M dimensions: there exists C s.t. ∀x we
have hX (x) ≤ C. This assumption allows us to bound the probability of errors that occur in
small regions of the space.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let the disutility, or cost to voter v ∈ V be fv(x) = ‖x− xv‖p for all x ∈ X . We use the following
technical lemma:
Lemma 1. For q ∈ {1, 2,∞}, there exists K2 ∈ R+ s.t. ‖g˜v(x)− gt‖2 ≤ K2, ∀ gt ∈ ∂fv(x) for any
v and x.
The lemma bounds the error in the movement direction from the gradient direction, by noting that
both the movement direction and the gradient direction have bounded norms.
We also need the following lemma, which is proved separately for each case in the following sections.
Lemma 2. Suppose that fv(x) , ‖xv − x‖p and define the function
At , I{g˜vt(xt) /∈ ∂fvt(xt)},
where g˜vt(xt) is as defined in (2). Then there exists C ∈ R s.t. ∀ n, P(At = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt, when
(p = 2, q = 2), (p = 1, q =∞), or (p =∞, q = 1).
The lemma can be interpreted as follows: At indicates a ‘bad’ event, when a voter may not be
providing a true subgradient of her utility function. However, the probability of the event occurring
vanishes with rt, which, as we will see below, is the right rate for the algorithm to converge.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are Lp normed,
and voters respond to query (1) according to either Model A or Model B. Then, ILV with Lq
neighborhoods converges to the societal optimal point w.p. 1 when (p, q) = (2, 2), (1,∞), or (∞, 1).
Proof. We will show that Algorithm 2 meets the conditions in Theorem 5. Let bt , Et[g˜vt(xt)]− g¯t
and zt , g˜vt(xt)−Et[g˜t], for some g¯t ∈ ∂f¯(xt). Then, g˜vt(xt) can be written as g˜vt(xt) = g¯t+zt+bt.
We show that bt, zt meet the conditions in the theorem, and so the algorithm converges.
Let At be the indicator function described in Lemma 2. Then, for some g¯t ∈ ∂f¯(xt),
bt = Et[g˜vt(xt)]− g¯t
= Et[g˜vt(xt)]− Et[gt] Theorem 4, i.i.d sampling of v
= P(At = 1|Ft)(Et[g˜vt(xt)|At = 1]− Et[gt|At = 1])
+ P(At = 0|Ft)(Et[g˜vt(xt)|At = 0]− Et[gt|At = 0])
= P(At = 1|Ft)(Et[g˜vt(xt)|At = 1]− Et[gt|At = 1])
≤ Crt(Et[g˜vt(xt)|At = 1]− Et[gt|At = 1]). Lemma 2
Combining with Lemma 1, and the fact that rt = r0/t, we have∑
rt‖bt‖ ≤ ∞ and there exists C1 ∈ R <∞ s.t. ‖bt‖2 ≤ C1, ∀ t.
Finally, note that ‖zt‖ , ‖g˜vt(xt) − Et[g˜vt(xt)]‖ is bounded for each t because the ‖g˜vt(xt)‖ is
bounded as defined. Thus, all the conditions in Theorem 5 are met for both bt and zt, and the
algorithm converges.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Instead of moving to their favorite point on the ball, voters now instead move in the direction of
the gradient of their utility function to the boundary of the given neighborhood. In this case, we
have:
g˜vt(xt) =
gvt
‖gvt‖q
; for gvt ∈ ∂fvt(xt). (3)
The key to the proof is the following observation, that the q norm of the gradient of the p norm,
except at the ideal points on each dimension, is constant. This observation is formalized in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3. ∀ (p, q) s.t. p > 0, q > 0, and 1/p+ 1/q = 1, ‖∇‖x− xv‖p‖q = 1, ∀x s.t. xm 6= xmv for
any m.
Theorem 2. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are Lp normed,
and voters respond to query (1) according to Model B. Then, ILV with Lq neighborhoods converges
to the societal optimal point w.p. 1 for any p > 0 and q > 0 such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
Proof. Since the probability of picking a voter v such that xmt = xmv for some dimension m is 0, we
have g˜vt(xt) = gvt for gvt = ∇fvt(xt). Thus we obtain the gradient exactly, and hence Theorem 5
applies with bt = 0 for all t.
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C.5 Proof of Propositions
We now turn our attention to the case of Weighted Euclidean utilities and show that Algorithm 2
converges to the societal optimum. The analogue to Lemma 2 for this case is (proved in the following
subsection):
Lemma 4. Suppose that fv(x) ,
∑K
k=1
wkv
‖wv‖2 ‖xk − xkv‖2, and define the function
At , I{g˜vt(xt) /∈ ∂fvt(xt)},
where g˜vt(xt) is as defined in (2) for q = 2. Then there exists C ∈ R s.t. ∀n, P(At = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt.
Proposition 1. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are
Weighted Euclidean, and voters correctly respond to query (1) according to either Model A or
Model B. Then, ILV with L2 neighborhoods converges with probability 1 to the societal optimal
point.
Proof. The proof is then similar to that of Theorem 1, and the algorithm converges to x∗ =
arg minE
[∑K
k=1 w
k
v‖xk−xkv‖2
‖wv‖2
]
.
Now, we sketch the proof for fully decomposable utility functions and L∞ neighborhoods.
Proposition 2. Suppose that conditions C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, the voter utilities are de-
composable, and voters respond to query (1) according to either Model A or Model B. Then, ILV
with L∞ neighborhoods converges with probability 1 to a point in the set of medians x¯.
Proof. Consider each dimension separately. If xmt−1 < xmv , then the sampled voter increases xmt−1 by
rt as long as xmt−1 + rt ≤ xmv . On the other hand if xmt−1 > xmv , then the sampled voter decreases
xmt−1 by rt as long as xmt−1 − rt ≥ xmv . Thus except for when a voter’s ideal solution is too close to
the current point, the algorithm can be seen as performing SSGM on each dimension separately as
if the utility function was L1 (the absolute value) on each dimension. Thus a proof akin to that of
Theorem 1 with p = 1, q =∞ holds.
C.6 Proof of Theorem 3
We now show that the algorithm finds directional equilibria in the following sense: if under a
few conditions a trajectory of the algorithm converges to a point, then that point is a directional
equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Suppose that C1, C2, and C3 are satisfied, and let G(x) , Ev
[ ∇fv(x)
‖∇fv(x)‖2
]
. Suppose,
G(x) is uniformly continuous, L2 movement norm constraints are used, and voters move according
to Model B. If a trajectory {x}∞t=1 of the algorithm converges to x∗, i.e. xt → x∗, then x∗ is a
directional equilibrium, i.e. G(x∗) = 0.
Proof. Suppose x∗ is not a directional equilibrium, i.e. ∃ > 0 s.t. ‖G(x∗)‖2 = . Consider a
δ-ball around x∗, Bδ , {x : ‖x∗ − x‖2 < δ}, with δ, 2 > 0 chosen such that ∃m ∈ {1 . . .M} s.t.
∀x ∈ Bδ, sign(Gm(x)) = sign(Gm(x∗)) and |Gm(x)| > 2, i.e. the gradient in the mth dimension
does not change sign and has magnitude bounded below. Such a δ, 2 exists by the continuity as-
sumption (if x∗ is not a directional equilibrium, at least 1 dimension of G(x∗) is non-zero and thus
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one can construct a ball around x∗ such that G(x), x ∈ Bδ in that dimension satisfies the conditions).
Now, one can show that the probability of leaving neighborhoods around x∗ goes to 1: ∀t >
0, 0 < δ2 < δ, w.p. 1 ∃τ ≥ t s.t. ‖xτ − x∗‖2 > δ2.
Suppose xt ∈ Bδ2 (otherwise τ = t satisfies), rk = 1k .
xτ = xt +
τ∑
k=t
∆xk ∆xk , −rk ∇f
vk(xk)
‖∇fvk(xk)‖2
‖xτ − x∗‖2 = ‖xt − x∗ +
τ∑
k=t
∆xk‖2
≥ ‖
τ∑
k=t
∆xk‖2 − ‖xt − x∗‖2
≥ ‖
τ∑
k=t
∆xk‖2 − δ2
‖
τ∑
k=t
∆xk‖2 ≥ |
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m| defn of ‖ · ‖2
= |Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
+
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m − Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
|
≥ |Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
| − |
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m − Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
|
By Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr
(
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m − Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
≥ 3
)
≤ exp
[
−2(τ − t)
223
2
∑τ
k=t
1
k
]
→ 0 as τ →∞
Furthermore, by the continuity assumption,
|Ev
[
τ∑
k=t
∆xk,m
]
| , |
τ∑
k=t
rkGm(xk)|
→ ∞ as τ →∞ while xk ∈ Bδ2
Thus, Pr(‖xτ − x∗‖2 > δ2) → 1 as τ →∞. Thus, if an infinite trajectory converges to x∗, then
w.p. 1, then x∗ is a directional equilibrium.
C.7 Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1 For q ∈ {1, 2,∞}, ∃K2 ∈ R+ <∞ s.t. ‖g˜vt − gt‖2 ≤ K2, ∀ gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt), vt, xt.
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Proof.
‖g˜vt(xt)− gt‖2 ≤ ‖g˜vt(xt)‖2 + ‖gt‖2
=
‖xt − arg minx[‖x− xvt‖p : ‖x− xt‖q ≤ rt]‖2
rt
+ ‖gt‖2
≤ K1 + ‖gt‖2
≤ K2
for some K1,K2 ∈ R+. The second inequality follows from the fact that for finite M-dimensional
vector spaces, ‖y‖2 ≤ ‖y‖1 and ‖y‖2 ≤
√
M‖y‖∞. The third follows from the norm of the subgra-
dients of the p norm being bounded.
Lemma 2, case (p = 2, q = 2).
Proof. Remember that At , I{g˜vt(xt) /∈ ∂fvt(xt)}. Let Bt = I{‖xvt − xt‖2 ≤ rt}. We show that
A) Bt = 0 =⇒ At = 0, and B) ∃C ∈ R s.t. P(Bt = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt. Then, ∃C ∈ R s.t.
P(At = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt.
Part A, Bt = 0 =⇒ g˜vt(xt) = gt, for some gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt):
First, note that
∂fvt(x) = ∂‖x− xvt‖2
=
{
{ x−xvt‖xvt−x‖2 } x 6= xvt
{g : ‖g‖2 ≤ 1} x = xvt
If ‖xvt − xt‖2 > rt, then
arg min
x
[‖x− xvt‖2 : ‖x− xt‖2 ≤ rt] = xt + rt
xvt − xt
‖xvt − xt‖2
Then,
g˜vt(xt) =
xt − arg minx[‖x− xvt‖2 : ‖x− xt‖2 ≤ rt]
rt
Definition
=
xt −
(
xt + rt
xvt−xt
‖xvt−xt‖2
)
rt
=
xt − xvt
‖xvt − xt‖2
∈ ∂fvt(xt)
Part B, ∃C ∈ R s.t. P(Bt = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt:
P(Bt = 1|Ft) = P(‖xvt − xt‖2 ≤ rt|Ft)
=
∫
x∈{x:‖x−xt‖2≤rt}
hX|Ft(x)dx
=
∫
x∈{x:‖x−xt‖2≤rt}
hX (x)dx v drawn independent of history
≤ Cr2t bounded hX
≤ Crt rt ≤ 1 eventually
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for some C ∈ R <∞. Note that C depends on the volume of a sphere in M dimensions.
Lemma 2, case (p = 1, q =∞).
Proof. Let hvt(xt) ,
[
sign(x1vt − x1t ), . . . , sign(xmvt − xmt ), . . . , sign(xMvt − xMt )
]T
Let Bt = I{∃m, |xmvt − xmt | ≤ rt}. We show the the same two parts as in the above proof.
Part A, Bt = 0 =⇒ g˜vt(xt) = gt, for some gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt):
First, note that the subgradients are
∂fvt(x) = ∂‖x− xvt‖1
= {g : ‖g‖∞ ≤ 1, gT (x− xvt) = ‖x− xvt‖1}
If ∀m, |xmvt − xmt | > rt, then
arg min
x
[‖x− xvt‖1 : ‖x− xt‖∞ ≤ rt] = xt + rthvt(xt)
Then,
g˜vt(xt) =
xt − arg minx[‖x− xvt‖1 : ‖x− xt‖∞ ≤ rt]
rt
Definition
=
xt − (xt + rthvt(xt))
rt
= −hvt(xt)
∈ ∂fvt(xt)
Part B, ∃C ∈ R s.t. P(Bt = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt:
P(Bt = 1|Ft) = P(∃m : |xmvt − xmt | ≤ rt|Ft)
=
∫
x∈{x:∃m,|xm−xmt |≤rt}
hX|Ft(x)dx
=
∫
x∈{x:∃m,|xm−xmt |≤rt}
hX (x)dx v drawn independent of history
≤ Crt bounded hX , fixed M, bounded X
for some C ∈ R < ∞. In the last line, C u 2M(diameter(X )), based on the volume of the slices
around the ideal points on each dimension.
Lemma 2, case (p = 1, q =∞).
Proof. Let m¯t ∈ arg maxm |xmvt − xmt |,
Let hvt(xt) ,
[
0, 0, . . . , 0, sign(xm¯tt − xm¯tvt ), 0, . . . , 0, 0
]T ,
Let Bt , I{∃m 6= m¯t : |xm¯tvt − xm¯tt | < |xmvt − xmt | + rt}. We show the the same two parts as in the
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above proofs.
Part A, Bt = 0 =⇒ g˜vt(xt) = gt, for some gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt):
First, note that when Bt = 0, the set of subgradients is
∂fvt(x) = ∂‖x− xvt‖∞
= {hvt(xt)}
Also when Bt = 0,
arg min
x
[‖x− xvt‖∞ : ‖x− xt‖1 ≤ rt] = xt − rthvt(xt)
Then,
g˜vt(xt) =
xt − arg minx[‖x− xvt‖1 : ‖x− xt‖∞ ≤ rt]
rt
Definition
=
xt − (xt − rthvt(xt))
rt
= hvt(xt)
∈ ∂fvt(xt)
Part B, ∃C ∈ R s.t. P(Bt = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt:
P(Bt = 1|Ft) = P(I{∃m 6= m¯t : |xm¯tvt − xm¯tt | < |xmvt − xmt |+ rt}|Ft)
=
∫
x∈{x:∃m 6=m¯t s.t. |xm¯tvt −x
m¯t
t |<|xmvt−xmt |+rt}
hX|Ft(x)dx
=
∫
x∈{x:∃m 6=m¯t s.t. |xm¯tvt −x
m¯t
t |<|xmvt−xmt |+rt}
hX (x)dx v drawn independent of history
≤ Crt bounded hX , fixed M, bounded X
for some C ∈ R <∞. Note that C u 2M2(diameter(X )), based on the volume of the slices around
each dimension.
Lemma 3 ∀ (p, q) s.t. p > 0, q > 0, 1/p+ 1/q = 1, ‖∇‖x− xv‖p‖q = 1,∀x s.t. ∀m,xm 6= xmv .
Proof. If xm 6= xmv ,∀m :
∇m‖x− xv‖p = ∇m
(∑
m
|xm − xmv |p
)1/p
=
1
p
∇m|xm − xmv |p
(
∑
m |xm − xmv |p)1−1/p
=
|xm − xmv |p−1 (∇m|xm − xmv |)
‖x− xv‖p−1p
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Then
‖∇‖x− xv‖p‖q = ‖|x
m − xmv |p−1 (∇m|xm − xmv |)
‖x− xv‖p−1p
‖q
=
1
‖x− xv‖p−1p
(∑
m
∣∣|xm − xmv |p−1 (∇m|xm − xmv |)∣∣q
)1/q
=
1
‖x− xv‖p−1p
(∑
m
|xm − xmv |(p−1)q
)1/q
=
1
‖x− xv‖p−1p
‖x− xv‖p/qp (p− 1)q = p
= 1
Lemma 4 Suppose that fv(x) ,
∑K
k=1
wkv
‖wv‖2 ‖xk − xkv‖2, and define the function
At , I{g˜vt(xt) /∈ ∂fvt(xt)},
where g˜vt(xt) is as defined in (2) for q = 2. Then there exists C ∈ R s.t. ∀n, P(At = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt.
Proof. Let Bt = I{∃k s.t. ‖xkvt − xkt ‖2 ≤ rt}. We show the same two parts for Bt as for the proofs
for Lemma 2.
Part A, Bt = 0 =⇒ g˜vt(xt) = gt, for some gt ∈ ∂fvt(xt):
First, note that, when Bt = 0,
∂mfvt(xt) = ∂m
K∑
k=1
wkv
‖wv‖2 ‖x
k − xkv‖2
=
wkm
‖wv‖2
xm − xmvt
‖xkmvt − xkmt ‖2
where km is the subspace that contains the mth dimension
Also if Bt = 0, then
arg min
x
[
K∑
k=1
wk
‖wv‖2 ‖x
k − xkv‖2 : ‖x− xt‖2 ≤ rt
]
= xt + rt
[
. . . ,
wkm
‖wv‖2
xmvt − xm
‖xkmvt − xkmt ‖2
, . . .
]
Then,
g˜vt(xt) =
xt − arg minx[‖x− xvt‖2 : ‖x− xt‖2 ≤ rt]
rt
Definition
∈ ∂fvt(xt)
Part B, ∃C ∈ R s.t. P(Bt = 1|Ft) ≤ Crt:
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P(Bt = 1|Ft) = P(‖xvt − xt‖2 ≤ rt|Ft)
=
∫
x∈{x:∃k s.t. ‖xkvt−xkt ‖2≤rt}
hX|Ft(x)dx
=
∫
x∈{x:∃k s.t. ‖xkvt−xkt ‖2≤rt}
hX (x)dx v drawn independent of history
≤ Cr2t bounded hX
≤ Crt rt ≤ 1 eventually
for some C ∈ R <∞. Note that C depends on K and M .
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